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DYNAMIC CONSERVATISM AND THE DEMISE OF TITLE VI 
GORDON BONNYMAN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Dynamic conservatism” is the apparent oxymoron coined by the late 
M.I.T. organizational theorist Donald Schon.1  He used the term to describe the 
propensity of social systems to adjust in many complex, frequently 
unconscious ways in order to resist real alteration of the status quo.2  
Paradoxically, the more profound the fundamental change, the more dynamic 
systems prove to be in resisting it.  “Social systems resist change with an 
energy roughly proportional to the radicalness of the change that is 
threatened.”3 
As David Barton Smith has documented, the national policy of eliminating 
racism from the American health care delivery system certainly involved 
radical change indeed, and, as Schon would have predicted, that policy has 
been met with energetic and dynamic resistance.4  For all of the widespread 
changes in the health care system over the past four decades, racial inequality 
has proven remarkably resilient.  The evidence that David Williams and others 
have assembled establishes that sad fact beyond argument.5  Reading Smith 
and Williams together, one cannot help but think of William Faulkner’s 
famous dictum that “[t]he past is never dead.  It’s not even past.”6 
 
* Co-founder and Executive Director of the Tennessee Justice Center in Nashville, TN.  For more 
information on the center, visit their website at http://www.tnjustice.org/TJC.html. 
 1. See DONALD A. SCHON, BEYOND THE STABLE STATE (1971).  Schon observed, “The 
resistance to change exhibited by social systems is much more nearly a form of ‘dynamic 
conservatism’—that is to say, a tendency to fight to remain the same.”  Id. at 32. 
 2. Id. at 38-60. 
 3. Id. at 38. 
 4. See generally DAVID BARTON SMITH, HEALTHCARE DIVIDED: RACE AND HEALING A 
NATION (1999) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE DIVIDED]. 
 5. See, e.g., David R. Williams, Race, Health and Health Care, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 13 
(2004).  See also COMMITTEE ON UNDERSTANDING AND ELIMINATING RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING 
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTHCARE (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2003) 
[hereinafter UNEQUAL TREATMENT]. 
 6. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 92 (1951). 
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This description of the story is not to say, of course, that no real 
improvement has occurred.  Smith reminds us that, until Congress enacted 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,7 de jure racism was ubiquitous in 
health care facilities across the South.8  De facto segregation was 
commonplace in many other parts of the country as well.9  Explicitly racist 
policies rapidly disappeared in the face of creative, determined enforcement of 
federal civil rights laws, backed by the threat to withhold massive new 
Medicare and Medicaid funding.10  The present evidence shows that, to a 
troubling extent, the problem simply went underground, not away. 
Changes in subsequent decades affecting the organization and financing of 
health care have been dynamic and profound.  The alphabet soup that is now so 
familiar to us, but that was largely unimagined in 1965, attests to that reality,11 
yet the legal tools with which to combat racial inequality have not kept pace.  
In fact, one can follow in the sad history of Title VI enforcement a steady 
erosion of the national will to make the radical changes in the health care 
system that the law demanded. 
II.  THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL FUNDING POLICY ON MINORITY HEALTH 
CARE 
Federal funding of the American health care system is enormous and 
pervasive.  In the year 2000, federal spending constituted nineteen percent of 
total health expenditures and state and local governments accounted for 
approximately seventeen percent.12  These figures understate the federal role, 
however, because federal law drives much of the spending by other entities.  
For example, the federal government defines state government contributions to 
Medicaid and mandates beneficiary contributions to the cost of Medicare-
 
 7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, Title VI, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000)). 
 8. David B. Smith, Healthcare’s Hidden Civil Rights Legacy, 48 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 37 
(2004); see also Sara Rosenbaum et al., Civil Rights in a Changing Health Care System, HEALTH 
AFFAIRS, Jan.–Feb. 1997, at 90, 91-94 (noting that “[e]ven after the end of de jure segregation in 
the United States, private hospitals, some of which received federal financial assistance, 
continued to discriminate on the basis of race.”). 
 9. See Smith, Healthcare’s Hidden Civil Rights Legacy, supra note 8, at 23-25; SMITH, 
HEALTH CARE DIVIDED, supra note 4 passim (1999). 
 10. See SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED, supra note 4, at 121-42. 
 11. Financing or care delivery concepts that had not been conceived of, or at least that had 
not been implemented on a significant scale, include diagnosis related groups (DRGs), preferred 
provider organizations (PPOs), managed care organizations (MCOs), intensive care units (ICUs), 
ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs), skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), and prospective payment 
system (PPS), to name but a few.  Some of these changes posed new civil rights challenges.  See, 
e.g., Rosenbaum et al., supra note 8, at 95-102. 
 12. Cathy A. Cowan et al., Burden of Health Care Costs: Businesses, Households, and 
Governments, 1987–2000, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Spring 2002, at 131, 136. 
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covered services.13  These figures also omit substantial but indirect subsidies 
embedded in the tax code and other budget items.14  The Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), using common 
international indices, attributes forty-four percent of total American health care 
spending to government.15  The strings that are attached—or are not attached—
to funding of that magnitude powerfully influence which Americans receive 
medical treatment and on what terms they receive it. 
The early history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 demonstrated the potency 
of federal funding as a means of advancing the goal of equality.  The principal 
tool for combating such discrimination was Title VI of the Act.16  It provides 
that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or 
national origin, . . . be subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”17  Title VI regulations 
outlawed practices and methods of administrating federal programs that were 
discriminatory in effect without requiring proof of discriminatory intent.18  
When the political will existed to enforce the Act and subsequent regulations, 
as was the case when the Johnson Administration forced the desegregation of 
Southern hospitals, even energetic resistance to change could be—and was—
overcome.19 
Title VI remains on the books, of course, and still proclaims as national 
policy a determination that federal spending must not foster racial inequality.  
Given the influential role of federal funding in shaping health care delivery, 
one would expect that a generation after the enactment of Title VI, racial 
inequalities in health care would have long since disappeared.  How, then, can 
we account for the stubborn persistence of inequalities over so many years?  
One can only conclude that, Title VI notwithstanding, federal funding of health 
services and the policies that guide the expenditure of federal health funds 
continue to tolerate, if not actively foster, racial discrimination.20 
 
 13. Daniel M. Fox & Paul Fronstin, Letters, Public Spending for Health Care Approaches 
60 Percent, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Mar.–Apr. 2000, at 271-73. 
 14. John Sheils & Paul Hogan, Cost of Tax-Exempt Health Benefits in 1998, HEALTH 
AFFAIRS, Mar.–Apr. 1999, at 176-81. 
 15. GERARD F. ANDERSON ET AL., MULTINATIONAL COMPARISONS OF HEALTH SYSTEMS 
DATA, 2002, at 3 (2002), available at http://www.cmwf.org. 
 16. Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VI, § 601, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000d–d-7 (2000)). 
 17. Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VI, § 601, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000d). 
 18. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2)–(3) (2002); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280-82 (2001). 
 19. SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED, supra note 4, at 121-42. 
 20. See UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 5; ROBERT M. MAYBERRY ET AL., MOREHOUSE 
MED. TREATMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS CTR., RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN ACCESS TO 
MEDICAL CARE: A SYNTHESIS OF THE LITERATURE (1999) (report commissioned by the Kaiser 
Family Foundation). 
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Some of the causes of racial disparities in health status are subtle and 
poorly understood.  A number of major causes are starkly obvious, however, 
and can be laid directly at the feet of government health policy.  A couple of 
examples will be illustrative of this fact. 
The first example involves financial barriers to health care.  Many minority 
Americans lack equal access to health care simply because they lack insurance 
and cannot pay out of pocket.  America is the only major industrialized 
democracy that leaves a substantial part of its population without health 
insurance.21  It is well-known that racial and ethnic minorities make up a 
disproportionately large share of the more than 40 million people in the United 
States who lack health insurance.22  African-Americans are nearly twice as 
likely as whites to be uninsured, and Latinos are three times as likely.23  It is 
also well understood that being uninsured impairs access to care and results in 
increased morbidity and mortality.24  So while being insured is no guarantee 
that an African-American or Latino will receive equal treatment, the lack of 
insurance fairly promises that he will not. 
Therefore, if we are serious about eliminating racial disparities in health 
care and health status, then the United States must provide for universal health 
insurance of its citizenry.  The United States spends more than twice as much 
on health care as do most other industrialized democracies,25 and public 
expenditures in the United States are comparable to those of other countries 
that guarantee universal coverage as a matter of national policy.26  Indeed, 
while Americans disparage Britain’s National Health Service as “socialized 
medicine,”27 the United States pours substantially more government subsidies 
into its health care system than does the Untied Kingdom.28  Thus, America’s 
 
 21. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 3. 
 22. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE 
UNITED STATES: AMERICA AT THE CLOSE OF THE 20TH CENTURY 57 (1999) (hereinafter 
POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES) (observing that in 1999, there were 42.6 million 
uninsured people in America); UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 5, at 83 (stating that “[r]acial 
and ethnic minority Americans are significantly less likely than white Americans to possess 
health insurance.”). 
 23. POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 22, at 58. 
 24. COMMITTEE ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, 
COVERAGE MATTERS: INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE 5-6 (2001), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309076099/html/R1.html; COMMITTEE ON THE CONSEQUENCES 
OF UNINSURANCE, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE: TOO LITTLE, TOO 
LATE (2001), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309083435/html/R1/html. 
 25. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 9 (noting that in the United States in 2000, health 
care spending per capita was more than twice the OECD median). 
 26. Id. at 3. 
 27. See, e.g., THE DANGERS OF SOCIALIZED MEDICINE (Jacob G. Hornberger & Richard M. 
Ebeling eds., 1994). 
 28. In the United States, public funding of health care in 2000, adjusted for differences in the 
cost of living, totaled $2,051 per capita, or 43% more than the corresponding figure ($1,429) for 
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failure to achieve universal coverage is not because of a lack of resources or a 
lack of willingness to spend public funds on health care; rather, it is because of 
common misperceptions about the nation’s health care system. 
The failure to eliminate financial barriers to health care reflects political 
priorities.  For all of our periodic political clamor about the plight of the 
uninsured and the need to contain costs, we have yet to match reality with 
rhetoric.  National health policy consistently fuels rises in prices and provider 
incomes—already the highest in the world—at the expense of coverage for 
working families.29  As long as national policy leaves a large, and growing, 
segment of the minority population without health coverage, financial barriers 
to treatment will ensure the perpetuation of racial inequalities in health care.30 
Although assuring universal health insurance coverage is necessary for the 
elimination of racial inequalities, it alone is not sufficient.  As Williams and 
Smith both document, inequalities are not just the result of financial barriers 
resulting from a lack of health insurance.31  Racial discrimination occurs even 
when minority patients are adequately insured.  Such discrimination may not 
be racially motivated or, at least not consciously so, but the fact that those who 
engage in the discrimination are not consciously racist makes the effects no 
less damaging. 
A glaring example of such discrimination, and of the government’s 
complicity in its perpetuation, is the widespread practice among physicians of 
discriminating against Medicaid patients.  Many doctors set quotas on the 
number of such patients they accept, or they refuse to treat Medicaid patients 
altogether. 32  The practice is open, widespread and unapologetic—just like the 
 
the United Kingdom.  ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 18.  In the United States, public 
spending accounted for 44% of total per capita health care expenditures of $4,631.  Id. at 3, 12.  
In the United Kingdom, public spending accounted for 81% of total per capita health expenditures 
of $1,763.  Id. at 12, 18.  Public funding of health care in the United States accounted for 5.8% of 
the GDP, while public funding in the United Kingdom accounted for 5.9% of GDP.  Id. at 17.  
Americans’ confusion regarding the extent to which the government underwrites its health care 
system was typified by an encounter that former Senator Jim Sasser (D–Tenn.) is reputed to have 
had with an angry constituent during the 1994 electoral race in which he lost his seat to Dr. Bill 
Frist, who is now the Senate Majority Leader.  An elderly Tennessean wagged her finger in his 
face and warned him, “You keep the federal government’s hands off my Medicare.”  Even if the 
story itself is apocryphal, it nicely captures a lack of awareness that is commonplace regarding 
the role of government in financing and shaping health care delivery. 
 29. See Uwe E. Reinhardt et al., Cross-National Comparisons of Health Systems Using 
OECD Data, 1999, HEALTH AFFAIRS, May–June 2002, at 169, 175. 
 30. Robert J. Blendon et al., Inequities in Health Care: A Five-Country Survey, HEALTH 
AFFAIRS, May–June 2002, at 182 passim. 
 31. See generally Smith, Healthcare’s Hidden Civil Rights Legacy, supra note 8; Williams, 
supra note 5. 
 32. Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid Physician Participation: Patients, Poverty and Physician 
Self-Interest, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 191, 193 (1995) (noting that twenty-five percent of the nation’s 
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explicitly racially discriminatory practices of the early 1960s.  The 
overwhelming majority of physicians who today discriminate against Medicaid 
patients would be appalled by the suggestion that they refuse care to patients 
on the basis of their race.  Nevertheless, discrimination on the basis of 
Medicaid status has a similar effect because the poverty experienced by many 
minority patients makes them particularly dependent upon the Medicaid 
program for health coverage.33  To a significant extent, therefore, Medicaid 
operates as a proxy for race, at least in states with substantial minority 
populations.34 
Given the disproportionately adverse impact of Medicaid discrimination on 
minorities, one would expect that state and federal government agencies would 
invoke Title VI against recipients of federal funds who engage in such 
discrimination.35  It is only fair that a medical professional trained at public 
expense be held responsible for serving the diverse American public without 
discrimination.36  But this has not happened.  For one thing, as will be 
 
physicians refuse to treat Medicaid patients and that two-thirds of those physicians that do treat 
such patients limit the number they treat). 
 33. “Blacks are . . . five times more likely than whites to be covered by Medicaid.”  Sidney 
D. Watson, Health Care in the Inner City: Asking the Right Question, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1647, 
1648 (1993) (citations omitted).  Though doctors often express unfavorable attitudes towards 
Medicaid’s administration and policies and cite factors such as low payment rates and perceived 
red tape, these factors cannot fully explain providers’ negative perceptions of the program.  
Research suggests that antipathy towards Medicaid patients themselves is a major factor 
contributing to the refusal to treat this population.  See Janet D. Perloff et al., Medicaid 
Participation Among Urban Primary Care Physicians, 35 MED. CARE 142, 152-54 (1997); see 
generally, E. Kathleen Adams, Effect of Increased Medicaid Fees on Physician Participation and 
Enrollee Service Utilization in Tennessee, 1985–1988, 31 INQUIRY 173 (1995). 
 34. See, e.g., Linton v. Carney, 779 F. Supp. 925 (M.D. Tenn. 1990), aff’d Linton v. 
Comm’r of Health & Env’t, State of Tenn., 65 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 1995), and cert. denied, 517 
U.S. 1155 (1996). 
 35. Federal regulations require state Medicaid agencies, as well as the Office for Civil 
Rights (OCR), to ensure compliance with Title VI by various types of Medicaid providers such as 
hospitals and medical staffs.  45 C.F.R. § 80 (2002). 
 36. The federal government heavily subsidizes physicians’ education by a number of direct 
and indirect means.  See, e.g., Fitzhugh Mullan et al., Doctors, Dollars, and Determination: 
Making Physician Work-Force Policy, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Supp. 1993, 138.  That no one appears 
to have a firm grasp of the amount of those subsidies is a measure of just how unaccountable 
training programs and the medical profession are for the use of public funds.  In addition to 
various programs that support medical schools, the government is believed to pay more than half 
of the cost of graduate medical education.  Medicare and Medicaid were estimated to contribute 
$10.5 billion a year for the training of medical residents, with state governments contributing an 
additional $3.3 billion in non-Medicaid funding in 1998 and 1999.  See Karen Matherlee, Nat’l 
Health Pol’y Forum, Issue Brief, Federal and State Perspectives on GME Reform, June 22, 2001, 
at 2 (2001).  As of 1999, there were approximately 98,000 physicians in graduate training in the 
United States.  TASK FORCE ON ACADEMIC HEALTH CTRS., TRAINING TOMORROW’S DOCTORS: 
THE MEDICAL EDUCATION MISSION OF ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTERS 6 (2002), available at 
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discussed below, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) applies 
a fiction that doctors who receive Medicare payments are not recipients of 
federal funds and therefore need not comply with Title VI. 
The problem is not limited to a failure to take appropriate enforcement 
action.  Many state Medicaid agencies pursue policies that actually reinforce 
the effects of private Medicaid discrimination.  For example, through a 
mechanism known as “limited bed certification,” some states enforce policies 
for nursing homes that limit the admission of Medicaid patients and segregate 
those whom they do admit.37  Because, as previously noted, African-
Americans and other minority groups are much more dependent upon 
Medicaid than are whites, these policies are racially discriminatory in their 
effect. 
Federal law provides that in order for a facility to participate in the 
Medicaid program, the state must survey the facility and certify that it meets 
quality and resident protection requirements.38  Some states, acting at the 
direction of the facilities that they are supposed to regulate, certify only a 
limited subset of the facilities’ beds as “Medicaid beds.”39  This result means 
that while more affluent private-pay patients have access to all of the facility’s 
beds, Medicaid patients can only use those that are set aside as “Medicaid 
beds.”  This practice has long since been found to violate Title VI,40 yet the 
federal agency that oversees Medicaid still tolerates the practice.  Indeed, the 
practice is so commonplace that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services advise low-income patients needing nursing home care to do the 
following: “Check with the nursing home to see if they accept Medicaid, and if 
they have a Medicaid bed available. . . . You may be moved to another room or 
another section of the nursing home when your care is paid by Medicaid.”41 
Other states seek to limit access to emergency rooms for Medicaid patients 
or impose penalties when Medicaid patients receive medically necessary but 
 
http//www.cmwf.org.  Using these figures, government subsidies thus represent an annual public 
expenditure of more than $140,000 per medical resident. 
 37. Linton, 779 F. Supp. at 927-28. 
 38. 42 U.S.C. §1396r(g)(1)(A) (2000). 
 39. E.g., Linton, 779 F. Supp. at 927. 
 40. Id. at 934-35.  It should be noted that in the wake of Alexander v. Sandoval, the Linton 
court could no longer entertain the private plaintiffs’ Title VI suit against the nursing homes’ 
admission practices.  See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that there is no 
private right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations under Title VI).  In the Linton case, 
decided before Alexander v. Sandoval, the plaintiffs proved that those practices were 
discriminatory in effect though, facially neutral in intent.  Linton, 779 F. Supp. at 934-35. 
 41. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., GUIDE TO CHOOSING A NURSING HOME 36 (2003), available at 
http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Search/View/ViewPubList.asp. 
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non-emergency care through hospital emergency departments.42  Use of 
emergency rooms for routine care is time consuming and frequently 
demeaning for patients, and the care received in such settings is inherently 
discontinuous.  Resort to emergency rooms is an unpleasant necessity for many 
Medicaid patients, especially for minority patients as they cannot obtain access 
to primary care through private physicians’ offices.43  Rather than pressure 
physicians who receive federal funds to open their practices to Medicaid and 
other minority patients on a non-discriminatory basis, state policymakers often 
respond to this phenomenon with punitive practices aimed at restricting access 
to the only care available.44 
III.  THE DEMISE OF TITLE VI 
Why has Title VI not been more effective?  As early achievements in the 
desegregation of Southern hospitals demonstrated, the law certainly could 
produce change when there was the political will to enforce it.  But as Smith 
has recounted, that political will began to wane almost as soon as Title VI 
became law, and as federal enforcement withered, social and institutional 
 
 42. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ASS. SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EVAL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE EXPANSIONS: STATE EXPERIENCES IN 
DEVELOPING BENEFIT PACKAGES AND COST-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS, at Section IV (1998), at 
http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/health/reports/benefits/state_approaches_to_costsharing.htm#_Toc411996
435 (Feb. 17, 1998) (reviewing the experiences and discussing cost-sharing mechanisms used by 
various states).  See also VERNON SMITH ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE 
UNINSURED, STATES RESPOND TO FISCAL PRESSURE: STATE MEDICAID SPENDING GROWTH 
AND COST CONTAINMENT IN FISCAL YEARS 2003 AND 2004, at 30 (2003), at http://www.kff.org/ 
medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=22126 (noting that two 
states have “imposed new or higher copays for . . . hospital ER visits for non-emergency 
services”). 
 43. The Medicaid Access Study Group, Access of Medicaid Recipients to Outpatient Care, 
330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1426, 1428 (1994); Gary P. Young et al., Ambulatory Visits to Hospital 
Emergency Departments: Patterns and Reasons for Use, 276 JAMA 460, 460, 462 (1996). 
 44. The Tennessee Hospital Association’s president recently attributed a 31% increase in 
emergency room visits in Tennessee to the inability of patients in the state’s Medicaid managed 
care program to find physicians willing to accept them.  John Gerome, Study Blames TennCare 
for Rise in ER Visits, KNOXVILLE NEWS–SENTINEL, Dec. 14, 2002, at http://www.knoxnews. 
com/kns/state/article/0,1406,KNS_348_1608692,00.html.  “‘When TennCare patients cannot find 
doctors willing to see them or take care of them in a timely manner, they have little choice but to 
turn to hospitals who do not turn patients away.’”  Id. (quoting Craig Becker, President of the 
Tennessee Hospital Association).  Tennessee nonetheless imposes co-payments for emergency 
department visits for waiver-eligible enrollees above poverty unless they are admitted for 
inpatient care, even if the care obtained in the emergency room was medically necessary.  See 
Bureau of TennCare, New TennCare Co-Pay Schedule for Uninsureds and Uninsurable, at 
http://www.state.tn.us/ tenncare/copay.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] DYNAMIC CONSERVATISM AND THE DEMISE OF TITLE VI 69 
arrangements evolved in ways that perpetuated racial inequalities in health 
care.45 
Legislative and executive branch policies have conspired to fatally 
undermine enforcement of Title VI as applied to health care from the 
beginning.  Congress refused to budget adequate staff and administrative 
resources to monitor and enforce compliance.46  The short-lived effort by the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to eradicate segregation 
in Southern hospitals was only made possible by the temporary transfer of 
agency personnel into enforcement positions, a practice that could not be 
sustained for more than a short time.47  HEW used the few enforcement 
resources Congress provided to focus primarily on the daunting challenges of 
school desegregation.48  Little attention was paid to the health care system 
despite the pervasive presence of federal funding in that system.49  Moreover, 
after the health programs administered by the former HEW were reassigned to 
the new HHS in 1980, the new agency’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) 
continued to lack the resources and administrative wherewithal to fulfill its 
enforcement responsibilities.50 
Federal agency officials have also shared Congress’s ambivalent attitude 
towards enforcement.  HEW interpreted Title VI in a manner that effectively 
exempted physicians from compliance, and that interpretation has never been 
revised.51  By application of an ironic legal fiction, receipt of Medicare 
payments is not considered to make a physician a recipient of federal funds and 
therefore subject to Title VI.52  This dispensation has severely impaired Title 
 
 45. In a particularly ironic manifestation of dynamic conservatism, Smith describes how 
Southern hospitals exploited the very federal programs that had forced their abandonment of 
explicit segregation to finance de facto re-segregation.  The hospitals used Medicare funding for 
the construction of private hospital rooms, largely motivated by a quietly acknowledged desire to 
perpetuate the segregation of the races.  SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED supra note 4, at 229-33. 
 46. Id. at 125, 164-66. 
 47. Id. at 132-33, 160. 
 48. Id. at 167-68, 183. 
 49. Id. at 183-87. 
 50. SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED supra note 4, at 183-87.  See H.R. REP. NO 100-56 
(1987) (findings from an investigation of the OCR detailing the various ways in which the Office 
failed to fulfill its responsibilities). 
 51. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 6 FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT 
EFFORT—1974: TO EXTEND FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 118-19 (1975); Letter from 
Eileen M. Stein, General Counsel, to Louis Nuñez, Staff Director (Oct. 7, 1980) (“Applicability 
of Title VI to Medicare Part B”), reprinted in U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS 
ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE DELIVERY: A CONSULTATION SPONSORED BY THE UNITED STATES 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS APRIL 15–16, 1980, 851-64. 
 52. SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED supra note 4, at 161-64.  The rationale for the initial 
exemption was that Medicare’s Part B, which covers physician payments, was funded by 
beneficiaries’ premiums rather than congressional appropriations.  Id. at 162-63.  Whatever 
doubtful merit that distinction might have had has long since become moot.  Appropriations from 
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VI enforcement throughout the health care system.  Medicare payments are the 
principal source of federal funding for most physicians, and it is physicians 
who direct most of the medical care that Americans receive. 
Another crucial administrative policy that has reduced Title VI to all but a 
dead letter has been the refusal to collect data necessary for the assessment and 
enforcement of compliance.  Justice Department regulations implementing 
Title VI required HEW (and now require HHS) to “provide for the collection 
of data and information from applicants for and recipients of federal assistance 
sufficient to permit effective enforcement of title VI.”53  If Title VI is to have 
any meaning today, it is through its prohibition of policies and practices that, 
though racially neutral in intent, are discriminatory in their effect.  To monitor 
and enforce that prohibition requires the collection and analysis of statistical 
data that can reveal patterns of discrimination of which even the perpetrators 
may be unaware.54 
HHS, however, has never required health care providers to collect such 
data, much less report it.55  This failure makes it impossible to monitor 
compliance on a routine basis.  The absence of a requirement that providers 
collect and maintain such data severely hampers the government’s ability to 
investigate alleged discrimination when it receives a complaint56 because of 
the obvious impracticality of obtaining and analyzing records that it has never 
required recipients to keep.57 
 
the federal treasury now account for approximately seventy-five percent of Medicare payments to 
doctors.  CRAIG CAPLAN & RYAN COOL, PUB. POL’Y INST., AM. ASSOC. OF RETIRED PERSONS, 
THE STATUS OF THE MEDICARE PART A AND PART B TRUST FUNDS: THE TRUSTEES’ 2003 
ANNUAL REPORT 3 (March 2003), available at http://research.aarp.org/health/ 
dd87_medicare.html. 
 53. 28 C.F.R. § 42.406(a) (2003). 
 54. The medical literature on racial disparities in health care and health status is almost 
entirely based on such analysis.  Without provider-specific statistics, it is impossible to trace 
observed inequalities in treatment back to the actors responsible for those inequalities.  See 
UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 5 passim. 
 55. See, e.g., Madison-Hughes v. Shalala, 80 F.3d 1121, 1124-25 (6th Cir. 1996) (dismissing 
plaintiffs’ complaint and pointing out the lack of the existence of a “mandatory legal requirement 
that HHS routinely collect such data”). 
 56. See, e.g., United States v. Harris Methodist Fort Worth, 970 F.2d 94, 104 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that the HHS’s proposed search of a hospital’s records for evidence of compliance with 
Title VI constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment). 
 57. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) afforded HHS an 
opportunity to rectify its decades-old failure to collect data essential to monitoring and enforcing 
compliance with the Civil Rights Act.  HIPAA required the promulgation of standards for certain 
common health care-related electronic transactions.  See Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1320d-8 (2000)).  When it issued the regulations that established the standards, 
HHS acknowledged that the research community had requested the inclusion of such data in 
claims forms.  Health Insurance Reform: Standards for Electronic Transactions, 65 Fed. Reg. 
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By 1979, when education programs and related civil rights enforcement 
responsibilities were reassigned to a newly formed Department of Education, 
OCR’s enforcement of Title VI in federal health care programs had been 
reduced to meaningless paper shuffling.58  When the U.S. Civil Rights 
Commission reviewed federal enforcement in the health industry two decades 
later, its summary of that record was damning: 
For 35 years, HHS (and its predecessor agency, HEW) have condoned policies 
and practices resulting in discrimination against minorities and women in 
health care. 
. . . . 
There is little doubt that racial, ethnic, and gender disparities in health care will 
persist in the 21st century unless Federal enforcement of civil rights laws is 
strengthened.59 
Agency failure to enforce Title VI has become even more critical since the 
Supreme Court ruled that only the government could challenge discrimination 
that violates the effects test imposed by the regulations.60  Now, private 
litigants may only obtain relief under Title VI upon a showing of 
discriminatory intent.61  Such a showing is an almost impossible burden of 
proof that makes the law useless for dealing with the current manifestations of 
discrimination.  As Professor Williams points out, even the perpetrators of 
discrimination are unaware of their own biases.62  Health care providers and 
minority patients alike are unaware of the extent of racial inequalities in health 
care.63  Even if a patient suspects racial bias, the patient–provider relationship 
is such that it is impossible in most circumstances for the patient to confirm or 
dispel—much less prove—his suspicions.  The inability of victims of 
discrimination to invoke Title VI against such practices effectively makes 
private enforcement impossible. 
 
50,312, 50,337-38 (August 17, 2000).  The agency also conceded that the collection of racial data 
is necessary for understanding and reducing disparities in health care.  Id.  The agency refused the 
request anyway, stating that it would work with researchers to develop alternative data collection 
methods.  Id.  Three years later, the data collection requirements remain unchanged.  45 C.F.R. § 
162.1102 (2002). 
 58. See Kenneth Wing, Title VI and Health Facilities: Forms Without Substance, 30 
HASTINGS L.J. 137, 138 (1978). 
 59. 2 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE HEALTH CARE CHALLENGE: ACKNOWLEDGING 
DISPARITY, CONFRONTING DISCRIMINATION, AND ENSURING EQUALITY 14-15 (1999) (The Role 
of Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Efforts). 
 60. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293, 307 (2001). 
 61. Id. at 285-86, 293. 
 62. See Williams, supra note 5. 
 63. Id.; see generally UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 5. 
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When neither victims nor perpetrators are aware of the influence of latent 
racial bias, and when systemic data that would reveal the manifestation of such 
bias in patterns of discrimination is not collected, the prohibition against 
discrimination ceases to be enforceable law and is reduced to the status of mere 
moral exhortation. 
IV.  AN UNFINISHED AGENDA 
Ironically, the best present hope for fulfilling the promise of Title VI may 
lie in an appeal to the values of those whom the law has failed to reach.  The 
medical profession, which has largely been exempted from Title VI, perceives 
itself as committed to patient care on a non-discriminatory basis.  Doctors have 
a high regard for science and for evidence-based treatment norms.  These 
values, and the medical profession’s quest to provide quality care, are 
incompatible with racial bias in the delivery of health care.64  There is some 
evidence that these principles are already beginning to favorably influence the 
medical treatment of minority Americans.65 
Still, the good will of providers will not be enough to overcome the 
dynamic conservatism of racial inequality in health care, with its demonstrated 
capacity for self-perpetuation in the midst of cultural and institutional change.  
Too many of the barriers and burdens that minority Americans face are the 
product of public policies and institutional arrangements that are beyond the 
ability of individual health care providers to correct. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 expressed recognition that the government 
has an indispensable role in dismantling racial discrimination.  Not the least of 
the reasons why the Act was, and is still, necessary, is that, as Justice Brandeis 
remarked, “[o]ur government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.  For good 
or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.”66  Title VI of the Act 
committed the federal government to ensuring that public funding and public 
policy would foster racial justice.  Until we reaffirm that commitment and 
revitalize Title VI, the law will be no match for systems and policies that 
 
 64. See Sidney D. Watson, Race, Ethnicity and Quality of Care: Inequalities and Incentives, 
27 AM. J.L. & MED. 203 passim (2001). 
 65. Citing the need to collect racial information in order to combat disparities in health 
status, the California Medical Association and other organizations of health care providers have 
formally opposed Proposition 54, the 2003 California ballot initiative that would have prohibited 
the collection of such information.  Coalition for an Informed California, Endorsements (2002), at 
http://www.defeat54.org/endorsers.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).  In addition, recent research 
suggests that cardiologists may have modified their treatment patterns to eliminate racial 
disparities that were documented in earlier studies.  See generally, Saif S. Rathore et al., Race, 
Quality of Care, and Outcomes of Elderly Patients Hospitalized With Heart Failure, 289 JAMA 
2517 (2003) (finding that “[b]lack and white Medicare patients receive comparable quality of care 
during hospitalization for heart failure”). 
 66. Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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unconsciously conspire to perpetuate the tragic legacy of racial inequality in 
health care. 
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